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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE O,F UTAH 
\L\LKER HANK & TRUST COM-
P .\XY, a Utah corporation, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
\\'. S. BRDIHALL, Commissioner of 
Financial Institntiom; of Utah, BANK 
OF' FTAH, BANK OF BEN LOMOND, 
CITIZENS NATIONAL BANK, 
FIRSrr SECURITY BANK OF UTAH, 
X.A., and COMMERCIAL SECURITY 
B.\NK, 
Def enda;nts and Appellants. 
Case No. 
11628 
BRIEF OF RESPO,NDENT 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action brought by vValker Bank & Trust 
Company ("Walker Bank") against W. S. Brimhall, 
Commissioner of Financial Institutions of the State of 
Utah, (the "Commissioner") pursuant to Section 7-1-
26(4), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, for a 
judicial review of the decision of the Commissioner deny-
ing the application of vValker Bank for permission to 
1 
t'stahlish a branch bank to be 1ocah·d in South Oo-den 
b , 
Utah. The other defendant banks ·were protestants to 
the application in the proceedings lwfore the 
sioner and in the District Court were iwrmitted to inter. 
VPnP as parties defendant. 
DISPOSITION IN LOvVER COURT 
'I1he trial court granted plaintiff's motion for sum. 
rnary judgment and entered a declaratory judgment and 
decree that the denial by the Commissioner of the appli-
c-a tion of -Walker Bank for the establishment of thP 
branch at South Ogden "is hereby declared to be erron-
eous and not in accordance with law, that plaintiff's 
application for a branch bank at such location should 
11ave been granted and that such decision, being unlawful. 
is hereby set aside." The decree further ordered and 
directed the Cmmnissioner to grant plaintiff's applica-
tion for the branch bank in South Ogden. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks affirmance of the declaratory 
_judgment and decree of the District Court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondent accepts the statement of facts of appel-
lants with the following clarifications and additions'. 
Appellants have correctly quoted or paraphrast>d por-
tions of the findings of fact, conclusions and order of the 
Commissioner and of certain portions of the transcript 
of testimony at the hearing before the Commissioner 
2 
-
rl'lw court is asked to consider in particular the findings 
of fact, conclusions and order as a whole and in the con-
text in which the same were written. -While we have 
110 ohjeetion to the court considering the transcript of 
te:"timony at the hearing before the Commissioner, we 
:-:11ggest that corn;ideration of such transcript is not nec-
c:-::-:ary for the determination of this case. 
·we also wish to point out that following the con-
<'lusion of the hearing the Commissioner asked for an 
opinion of the then Attorney General, Phil L. Hansen. 
ri'he Attorney General's first response was contained in 
J1is opinion No. 68-045 dated July 26, 1968, a copy of 
,rhich is set forth in the appendix to this brief. In that 
(;pinio11 the Attorney General framed the question as 
follows: 
a branch bank be lawfully prohibited within 
thP corporate limits of South Ogden, Utah, a city 
of the second elass in which no unit bank is lo-
eated, hnt which is immediately adjacent to Ogden 
City, another city of the second class in which are 
presently located five unit banks, where it is 
shown by the e,·idence that the primary objective 
of the branch bank is not to serve South Ogden, 
in whieh it is physically to be located, but rather 
to sPrve Ogden? 
He concluded that the Commissioner coHld deny the 
hranel1 on the grounds that the public convenience and 
advantage "will be subverted rather than subserved." 
'l'he Attorney General in effect left the ultimate decision 
of granting or denying the branch up to the Commis-
tiioner, based on his determination of public convenience 
nnd adyantage. rrhe Commissioner was unwilling to de-
3 
termine that the public convenience and advantage would 
be "subverted" but instead determined, directly to the 
contrary, that the public connmience and advantagt 
would be snbserved and promoted by th(• t•stahlisln11e11 t 
of a vValker Bank branch in South Ogden ( Conel118ions, 
par. 4, R. 7). However, the Commissioner di cl ask 
for further advice which led to the Attorney General 
issuing the opinion of August 15, 19GS, No. GS-055 ·wliieJ1 
is set out in the appendix to Appellants' brief. In thi, 
opinion, Mr. Hansen ruled that the Commissioner mu,t 
deny the application as a matter of law even though h1: 
had concluded that the public conveniPnce and advantag1· 
would be promoted by the establishment of the proposed 
branch bank. The Commissioner based his ultimate de. 
cision the application solely on the advice givrn 
by the Attorney General (Conclusion 5, R. 7). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE DECISION OF THE COMMISSIONER WAS 
NOT IN ACCORDANCE WITH LAW. 
We propose to answer here both Point I and Point II 
of Appellants' Brief. 
The sole question involved in the court below and, 
we contend, the sole question involved here is the 
sufficiency of the Attorney General's second opinion to 
the Bank Commissioner dated August 15, 19G8. W1· 
alleged in paragraph 7 of our complaint that the Corn· 
missioner denied Respondent's branch application "solely 
on the ruling of law set forth in the opinion of the Attor· 
4 
JJt:.\' Gl'11ernl" (H. 3). This allegation was admitted by 
tl1c Commissioner (R. 14) which, of course, in good 
conscience he had to admit by the very terms of his 
1nitten conclusions in the case (Conclusion, Paragraph 5, 
R. 7). \Ve coute11ded below and contend here that the 
"c\ ttonwy General's opinion and the Commissioner's de-
were erroneous as a matter of law and the court 
J:elow so determined. 
An examination of the branch banking statutes upon 
,, Jiich this case depends and which are fully quoted in 
,\]Jpdiants' brief indicates that there are three prerequi-
sites to the establishment of a branch by any bank. First, 
tl1c· liank must have sufficient capital and surplus and 
no one here questions the sufficiency of the capital and 
Slll'Jll ns of Respondent for this purpose. Second, the 
prnposed brauch must be located within the corporate 
limits of a city or town in which city or town no other 
!Jank is located. There is, likewise, no question but that 
the proposed location of the ·walker Bank branch is 
\rithin 8outh Ogden, Utah, and while there are three 
branch hanks operating in that city, there are no unit 
hanks in the city. 111 Walker Bank d!; Trust Company v. 
Taylor, 16 U .2d 234, 390 Pac.2d 592, this court deter-
rni 1wd that the branch banking laws do not prohibit the 
(·stablishment of a branch bank in a city in which only 
branches of other banks are located. 
rrhe only other requirement is that the applicant 
show "to the satisfaction of the bank commissioner that 
tlw public convenience and advantage will be subserved 
and promoted by the establishment of such branch or 
5 
offiee.'' Here there can be no pro1wr contention that 
the Commissioner was not so satisfied in view of hi, 
Conclusion No. -! and his admission of paragraph G or 
our complaint that "the public conveni(·nce and advan-
tage would be subserved and promoted by the establish-
ment of such branch at the location proposed." (R. 
14) 
The Attorney General initially recognized these as 
the three requirements for the establishment of a branch 
hank for in his opinion of July 26, 1968 he advised the 
Commissioner that he would have grounds for deter-
mining that the granting of the \Valker Bank applica- · 
tion would not subserve and promote the public conven-
it'nce and advantage. In doing so, he assumed and state<l 
that the "specific statutory prohibition [as to location] 
does not foroolose the anticipated branch hank" and 
further, that the applicant must "show that the public 
convenience and advantage will be subserved by the new 
facility." The applicant here met that burden and the 
Commissioner specifically found that it had ml't the bm-
den. 'rhe Commissioner was unwilling to conclude that 
because the branch facility would be located nPar the 
8outh Ogden Cit)· boundary or that because applicant 
showed that it would draw customers from areas outside 
of South Ogden that thereby the public convenirncP and 
advantage would not be subserved and promoted. When 
the Commissioner refused to take the'' hint,'' r. Hanse11 
forced his hand by holding in his second opinion of 
August 15, 1968 that he must deny the Walker Bank 
application as a matter of law. In doing so he read into 
the branch banking statutes a requirement that simpl' 
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does not exist, a requirement that would limit the service 
area of a branch bank to the city limits of the city in 
which the branch facility is located. 
At this point we call the court's attention to the 
Jersey case In re Application of Howard Savings 
J11sfit11fio1l, 159 A.2d 113 (N.J. 1960). In this case the 
Court of New Jersey upheld the determination 
of t!H· NPw Jersey Commissioner of Banking and Insur-
all('(' apfH'O\'ing the application of a savings bank to 
e:,;tahlish a branch in the incorporated area of North 
Caldwell. The opinion describes the geographical and 
"co11omic situation of the area indicating a typical situa-
tion of urban sprawl affecting seven city areas. (This is 
analogorns to the situation here where North Ogden, Og-
ckn, South Ogden, Riverdale, Roy and other North Davis 
Count.\· communities tend to run together and constitute 
a :-oing-Je metropolitan area.) A large increase in popula-
tion had occurred. The cities were essentially residential 
communities and the retail center for the area was the 
wajor cit.\· of Caldwell with only a few retail businesses 
in the other cities. There were no banks or branches 
lo('ated in Korth Caldwell but there were banks in Cald-
well. The CalchYell City boundary was about 400 feet 
W<'st of the branch site in North Caldwell. Immediately 
aeross the street from the branch site was the city of 
Essex Fells, which had no banks or branches, and about 
700 feet east of the branch site '.vas the city limits of 
Verona in which city was located another bank. 
The New Jersey statute permitted branch banks to 
lw e>stahlished in a municipality in the same county in 
which the applicant bank had its principal office "in 
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which no banking institution has its principal office or 
a branch office." The Commissioner of Banking was 
required to determine "that the inkrests of the public 
will be served to advantage by the establishment of suc]1 
branch office." The Commissioner was also required 
to determine that the conditions in the "locality in which 
the proposed branch office' is to be established" indicatP 
that the branch could operate successfully (Utah has 
no such requirement). 
It was contended that m determining whether the 
branch office could be successfully operated, the Com-
missioner and the applicant were limited to evidence of 
business to be derived from the particular municipality 
in which the branch was to be located. The court held 
that instead the proper criteria was the area to he served 
by the branch even though this ext0nded beyond muni-
cipal boundaries. The branch must he 0stablished within 
the boundaries of a municipality but the Commissioner 
must consider the economic effect of the proposed branch 
to determine whether the criteria of public i11terest ancl 
successful operation are met. The court stated that 
plainly the criteria of public interest was to be co11sicl-
erecl on a service area basis. 
It is indeed most a1ipropriate that the vital 
questions of public interest and prohahl<> success 
be viewed without rt>gard to mere artificial lines. 
Banking, like any business and most human activ-
ity these days, is not and should not be confined 
by political boundariPs. Cf. Duffcon Concrek 
Products v. Borongh of Cresskill, 1 N.Y. 509, 5i::l, 
64 A.2d 347, 9 A.L.R.2d 678 (1949). RPalism is 
the sounder basis of anv substantive test. In 
banking that is best indicated by conditions in and 
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of the whole an•a ·which the proposed institution 
or branch would normally expect to draw upon 
and serve. Again we cannot 4uarrel with the basis 
prescribed by tlie Legislature, either alone or in 
conjunction with the initial municipal requisite. 
(159 A.2d at 123) 
Hansen concluded in his second opinion and Ap-
pellants argue in their brief that the branch banking stat-
utes are designed to protect banks from competition of 
ont of city banks. This argument is based solely on the 
admitted fact that branches cannot be established in 
unincorporated areas of counties (other than Salt Lake 
Connt:·) or in incorporated areas (other than Salt Lake 
Cit:·) in which any unit bank is located whereas unit 
hanks can be located in such areas. The conclusion is a 
romplete non sequitur. Banking is a regulated industry, 
but it is regulated for the public interest, not for the 
interest of existing banks. Excessive competition is an 
t·l1•nwnt to be considered in determining whether the 
establishment of a new branch would be in the public 
interest, but this determination is made from the point 
of view of the public rather than the banks which are 
affected by the competition. The question is whether 
tl1t> new facility is needed by the public and, if estab-
lisht>d, whether the competition would jeopardize the 
safety of existing institutions to the detriment of the 
pnhlic. These considerations are present for a new unit 
hank as well as for a new branch bank. The Commis-
sioner here found and concluded that existing banks in 
the Ogden metropolitan area (and this includes all of the 
protPstant banks) are financially stable and secure insti-
tutions, that increased competition from the proposed 
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vV alker Bank branch would not unreasonably intnf 
with the operation of these existing banks and branches 
and that such competition "would not jeopardize the 
depositors of such banks, would not interfere with 
ability of these banks to maintain their finanrial strPngth 
and ·would not impair their ability to compete with thP 
applicant bank and other banks." 
Furthermore, if avoiding bank competition is a legis-
lative policy, it is enunciated most strongly in the stat-
utes pertaining to the establishment of unit banks. A unit , 
bank can be established only if the Commissioner detPr-
mines, among other tirings, that: 
"the location or field of opPration of th<> proposPd 
business ... [is not] in sueh proximity to an 
established ... [financial institution] that such 
established business might bP unn·asonahi>· intPr-
f ered with .... " ( SPction 7-1-:2() ( 1 ) , t ·tali Codi· 
Annotated 1953). 
Note that under this section consideration must be given 
to the effect on all existing financial institutions, both 
existing unit banks and existing branch banks, considPra-
tion must be given to proximity, in the sense of distance 
at least, without regard to boundaries of cities or towns. 
and finally consideration must be given to not 
the location of the new unit bank, but also to its field 
of operation or service area. None of these requiremt>nt::; 
are in the branch banking statute except for branelws i. 
in Salt Lake County where a branch may not be estah-
lished "in such close proximity to an established bank 
or branch as to unreasonably interfere with the businP8S 
thereof." (7-3-6) The omission of these specific require-
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ments makes it much more logical to find a legislative 
policy indifferent to competitive effects on existing banks 
in connection with branch bank applications outside of 
f-:alt Lake County. 
The better answer to the whole question is stated 
hy the New Jersey Supreme Court in the Haward Sav-
i 11qs case as follows: 
Evident from the statutes is a fundamental 
distinction hetween the basic physical requisites 
for a new hank or savings and loan association 
and for a branch office. The fonner can be estab-
lished in a political subdivision where another 
similar institution already exists; a branch can-
not he, although it may be permitted in the next 
rnnnicipalit,\' and thereby compete. We see no 
reason 1Ch.1J the Legislahtre cannot so differentiate 
if it chooses to do so or why it may not use the 
economically artificial municipal boundary as the 
preliminary mcci.s11ring rod. There is the advan-
tage of initial certainty. Moreover, a new bank 
is an expensive undertaking and is generally pro-
posed or organized by local people in response 
to some local need for additional banking facili-
ties, fairly broadly felt and with sufficient depth 
to warrant the capital risk. The statutory scheme 
quite properly gives preference here to local in-
terests organizing the new facility as against an 
out-of-town institution seeking to seize the oppor-
tunity to establish a branch and thereby compete 
in close quarters with a bank already in existence. 
Bv the same token, where there is legitimate room 
in. an area for further banking facilities, it is 
Pntin•lv reasonable to say that establishment of 
a comiwting outside should not be per-
mi tkd right next door, so to speak, to the estab-
lished institution, but that competition may be 
11 
allmccd, if in the zmlJlic interest, from a location 
across the mu11icipal boundary. Also, some muni-
cipalities in need of banking facilities rnav not 
have sufficient local capital or pot<>ntial to 
creation of a new institution but their ncc<l an;] 
convenience may be• adt•quately mPt by the ma;11_ 
tenance of a lt>ss exrwnsive branch. Stokt•s, supra, 
74 Banking Law J onrnal at i>. It is well 
kno,vn that branch banking is a controvt>rsial sub-
ject, substantially not permith>d in New J ersrv 
outside the muncipality of the principal 
until 1948, and it seems appan•nt that the L('gis-
lature, in prescribing the physical scheme it hal', 
adopted a compromise between competing inte-r-
ests in the banking field, which was f•ntirel,\- within 
its power to do. (159 A.2d at 122; empl1asis add(•d) 
'I1his we contend is the same type• of policy adopted by 
our legislature - a resolution or compromise between 
competing banking philosophies done on the basis of 
geographical prohibitions and in reliance on the ability 
of the Commissioner to determine the public convenience 
and advantage. 
The Attorney General and Appellants both argue at 
great length that Walker Bank is by a subtPrfuge trying-
to establish a branch where it cannot legally establish a 
branch. \Ve take it that neither Appellants nor the former 
Attorney General mean by the word "subterfuge" that 
\Valker Bank is attempting by some trick or device to 
conceal the true facts of this case or obtain an under the 
table advantage. Respondent has at all times hPen frank 
and open in its presentation of its application. We have 
always pointed out that we believed that the proposed 
branch would serve an area not only of South Ogden 
12 
but of other parts of the Ogden metropolitan area in-
duding Ogden City itself, other parts of \Veber County 
and parts of North Davis County. Respondent is not 
attempting to avoid anything but rather to comply with 
the branch banking statutes and present our application 
on a realistic basis. We again call the court's attention 
to the statement in the Howard Savings case quoted 
above (supra, p. 8) that banking is not and should 
not be confined by political boundaries. Under our law 
Oie branch must be established within the boundaries of a 
municipality in which a unit bank is not located, but 
tl1en' is nothing in our statutes that limits the service 
area of the proposed branch to the municipality in which 
it was located. The Commissioner cannot realistically 
assrss the public convenience and advantage element of 
tlH' statute unless he is presented with evidence of what 
thP service area of the proposed branch is likely to be. 
1 lt>rP \Yalker Bank showed that the proposed branch 
\\ ould sPrve South Ogden and would also serve Ogden 
and othn areas in "Weber County and North Davis Coun-
t.'· in tlw Ogden metropolitan area. Taking this into 
aceount, the Commissioner found that the public conven-
iPnce and advantage would be subserved and promoted. 
Nothing further was required. 
\Ve agree with Appellants that courts have been 
quick to strike down evasions of branch banking laws. 
lf \Valker Bank was here trying to move its main office 
at Second South and Main Street in Salt Lake City or 
another branch of vValker Bank to South Ogden, Utah, 
we are sure this court would look very closely at the situ-
ation and likely follow the decisions of Marion National, 
13 
Bank i:. Camp (Dist. Ct., N.D. Ind. 19()8); Bank of Dear-
born v. Saxon, 244 Fed. Supp 394, 377 Fed.2d 496 and 
In re Princeton Bank & Tru;,t Cornpany (N.J.) 208 A.2d 
820. The court might similarly be concerned if \Valker 
Bank had not applied for a branch in South Ogden, but 
instead set up a night depository and an armored car 
pickup and delivery service to serve South Ogden and 
other parts of the Ogden metropolitan area similar to 
the bank involved in Dickinson v. First National Bank 
in Plant City, 400 Fed.2d 548. We know we would be in 
trouble if after opening the South Ogden Branch we 
rplocated it in Ogden City, which was the effect of the 
decision in American Bank d!; Tru;,t Com1Hrny 1.:. Saxon, 
373 Fed.2d 283. No such "subterfuge" is involved here. 
Our object is and has been to serve the public and om 
own best interests by locating a branch bank within the 
city limits of South Ogden to serve South Ogden and 
other parts of the Ogden metropolitan area (and, for that 
matter, anyone else wherever located who chooses to do 
business with us at the South Ogden branch). 
Appellants, of course, cannot contend that tlw branch 
banking laws prohibit a branch from accepting husiness 
from any other place than the municipality in which thr 
hranch facility is located. If this is so, the practical 
result would be to make illegal all or at least most of the 
existing branches of all banks in the state, including the 
South Ogden branches of the Appellant banks. All of 
these banks have admitted that they accept business at 
these branches from outside of South Ogden (see Re-
quests for Admissions (R. 22-27) and the various answers 
to such requests (R. 50-56) - Commercial Security Bank 
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having failed to answer, the requested admissions are 
deemed admitted; also see Protestants Exhibit B show-
ing that the South Ogden branch of Bank of Utah had 
a :·mbstantial number of customers from areas outside 
of South Ogden including some customers who lived in 
Ogden City across the street from the Harrison Boule-
vard and Washington Terrace Branches of Commercial 
Security Bank, Tr. 269-270. 
'l1he offices of all banks can and must be permitted 
to accept business from wherever that business comes 
C\'Cll if it comes from a municipality or geographical 
area in which the office itself cannot be located. To con-
the statutes otherwise would create an impossible 
,.,ituatiun. One foresees a bank officer (or worse, a bank 
vxaminer) meeting each customer at the door with a 
re<1uest to identify the area in which the customer lives 
or does business and barring the door if the customer 
is from a "prohibited" area. Such an interpretation is 
ohvionsly not a part of the Utah statutes nor would any 
L(·gislatnre attempt to impose such a requirement. 
If Appellants and the former Attorney General mean 
tl1at a bank cannot locate a branch in a municipality 
\\IH're one of its objectives in locating the branch is 
to s0ne people living or doing business outside of the 
rnunicipality, then the branch banking laws rest on an 
unstable foundation indeed. It is no exaggeration to say 
that testimony from a branch applicant would be false 
if the testimony was that the applicant bank would only 
do businPss or expect to get business from the munici-
pality in which the branch was located. Testimony would 
15 
b<> similarly suspect if the applicant claimed that the 
soh• or primary purpose in establishing the branch was 
to sl'rV<" the citizens of South Ogden or some other city 
or town. Any bank in establishing its first office or 
branch office hopes to serv(• iwo1)IP who liv<• or 1rork 
near the office as well as those from other areas who 
choose to do business at that office. The banking husi-
ness simply does not operate on the hasis of wlwre a 
customer lives, works or has a place of business in rela-
tion to the location of the hanking facility. A customer 
li-dng many miles away may find it convenient for his 
purposes to do business at a particular location. If a 
branch applicant was required to prove that business 
would not be accepted outside of the municipality in 
·which the branch was located, no further branches could 
be established in the State of Utah because no bank could 
truthfully giYe such testimony. 
If the Legislature had intended to limit branch hank-
ing on a service area basis, it would have said so. 'l'he 
concept of a service area is a familiar one to the Legis-
lature for in connection with unit bank applications the 
Commissioner is required to determine that the "firld 
of operation" of the proposed unit bank will not unrea-
sonably interfere with existing financial institutions. 
7-1-26(1). Having failed to specify this in the branch 
banking statutes, there is no basis for implying such a 
requirement. 
The fact remains, then, that the location require-
ments of the branch banking statutes are simply that 
the branch office itself must be located within a certain 
area as defined by the statute. A striking application 
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of this is the case of First National Bank of Ccvnton v. 
('a11ton Exchange Bank, (Miss. 1963) 156 So.2d 580. In 
that case the statute permitted a branch office to be 
vstablished in a county in which the bank establishing 
the office is domiciled, but prohibited establishment of 
tlw branch office in certain towns or cities which had 
one or more banks or branch banks in operation. The 
town of Ridgeland in Madison County, Mississippi, is 
within the county in which both the First National Bank 
o :· Canton, a national bank, and the Canton Exchange 
Bank, a state bank, were located. Both banks applied 
J'or branch offices in the town of Ridgeland, the state 
hank to the State Comptroller and the national bank to 
1l1e Comptroller of the Currency. Both applications were 
U]>proved within a short time of one another, but the 
national bank opened up its office in the town first. 
Tlte state bank opened up its office some two wooks 
latt•r, but when it determined that it was within the town 
limits, it moved the office across the town boundary line 
to a location outside of the town, but only 200 yards 
away from the national bank office. Against the conten-
tion of the national bank that this was a maneuver to 
eircnmvent the requirements of the branch banking law, 
tl1t• court held that the state bank could lawfully estab-
lish its branch office. Of course, the court did not find 
that the move was motivated by the objective of evading 
and circumventing legislative policy but this does not 
distinguish the case as a precedent. The court, instead, 
applied the statute according to its terms holding that 
it "is plain and unambiguous and obviously must be con-
strued to mean what it says." .Judge Hanson in this 
ras0 ruled consistently with the Canton case and for the 
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reasons cited by the Mississippi court we suggest that 
this court must affirm his ruling. This court held in 
Walker Bank & Trillst Co. v. Tay.Zar, supra, that what 
is not permitted by the branch banking statutes is pro-
hibited but it must follow that what is permitted is not 
prohibited. 
Finally, Appellants have in their brief at pages lj 
and 16 and under their Point II contended that there is 
a fourth statutory criteria in our branch banking laws 
which, as we understand the contention, is a broad gen-
f:ral discretion vested in the Commissioner to den.'- a 
branch application even if the applicant has the necef.:-
sary oopital and surplus, will locate the branch in an 
area open to branching and has establised that the public 
convenience and advantage would be subseryed and pro-
moted by the establishment of the branch. Such discre-
tion, if granted by the Legislature, would undoubtedly 
be unconstitutional. \Ve still have a government of la\rs 
and not of men. Uncontrolled discretion in any person, 
however praiseworthy his motives, however searching his 
inquiry, however informed and devoted he may be, is 
not tolerated under our system of laws. There is wry 
clearly a right to the approval of an application where, 
as here, the three statutory requirements have been met. 
This is not to say that the Commissioner does not 
have discretion. He clearly does in the determination of 
whether the public convenienct• and advantage would he 
subserved and promoted. Under this category he wry 
proper!:-- can consider any number of factors such as 
the type of service proposed by the applicant ( Commis-
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siouer's Findings Paragraph 12, R.6), the financial con-
1litio11 arnl history of the applicant and the character and 
pa:-:t performance of its management (Commissioner's 
Findings Paragraph 15, R.6). One can suppose numerous 
other factors which the Commissioner might consider. 
Howe'»er, having considered these factors and exercised 
tl1<' proper discretion given to him to measure the public 
eorn'1•11ience and advantage, there is not a further area of 
disrn·tion left. If such were the law, judicial review 
\\·onld hc- meaningless and, more importantly, the public 
illte>rest roulcl be "subverted" by an irresponsible Bank 
C'ommi ssioner. 
POINT II 
THERE ARE NO UNRESOLVED ISSUES OF FACT 
IN THIS CASE. 
Appellants on pages 32 and 33 of their brief have 
c·orrectl>, summarized the pertinent pleadings and the 
aetion of the District Court in striking the pleaded de-
frnsP of the protestant banks that the Commissioner's 
finding of convenience and advantage was not supported 
h>· the evidence. The initial question, then, is whether 
tlw motion to strike was properly granted. 
Respondent took its appeal from the Commissioner's 
ch•nial of its application by filing an action in the Dis-
trid Court of Salt Lake County as required by Section 
7-1-26(4), Utah Code Annotated 1953. The appeal was 
filed on September 25, 1968, which was within 30 days 
nftPr the decision as required by such statute. Only the 
Commissioner was named as a defendant. It was not 
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until October 21, 1968 that the protestant banks made 
tht>ir Motion to Intervene which motion was graiit\·d 
by Order dated October 25, 1968. Both tht> filing of the 
Motion to Intervene and the granting of the Order ver-
mitting the intervention occurred after the ex1iiration of 
the 30 day period within which appeals can bt• takPn from 
a decision of the Commissioner. The Commissioner aid 
not contend in his answer that there "-as insufficient 
evidence to support the conclusion of public conven-
ience and advantage. This was raised only by the inter-
vening banks. The Conunissioner did not and has not 
sought to amend his answer to raise this issue and, 
accordingly, we contend he cannot properly raise it on 
appeal. 
So far as th0 protestant banks are concernPd, they 
have not appealed from the decision of the Commissioner 
within the time required by the statute. The present 
action was filed by Respondent 16 days after the decision 
of the Commissioner was rendered. The protestant banks 
not only had the same 30 days for appeal that Respond-
ent had, hut had 14 days after this action \Vas filed within 
which to file their own appeal if they felt any part of 
the decision was wrong. 
One must also consider the fact that the protestant 
banks are only intervenors in this proceeding. They must 
accept the action in the status in which it was at the timr 
of the intervention and are in no position to broaden the 
issues to a determination of a point on which they may 
feel agrieved. As persons with an interest in the outcome 
of the appeal and feeling that they might not be adc-
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quately represented by the Attorney General, they are 
clltitlc<l to intervene under Rule 24, Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, but they must accept the action in the status 
in which it is at the time of the intervention. This is 
particularly true when they failed to file a timely appeal. 
:Notwithstanding, the defense if permitted does not 
raise a question of fact. This is an appeal from an admin-
istrative proceeding on which a record was made. It has 
lwt>n the Pstablished policy of this court to consider 
such appeals only on the basis of the record and not 
permit a trial de novo in the sense of receiving or con-
additional testimony or other evidence presented 
to thP court. See, for example, Withers 1/. Golding, 100 
U. 179, 111 P.2d 550; Erkman v. Civil Service Commis-
,,w11, 118 U. 228, 198 P.2d 238; Building Service Em-
j1loyecs, etc. v. Newhoitse Realty Co., 97 U. 562, 95 P.2d 
507; Goodrich v. Public Ser1/ice Commission, 114 U. 296, 
198 P.2d 975; Hotel Utah v. Industrial Commission, 116 
e. 443, 211 P.2d 200; Chapman v. Graham, 2 U.2d 156, 
270 P.2d 821. If this were done here, the examination of 
the conrt would be limited to a question of law - based 
on the record was the finding of the Commissioner of 
public convenience and advantage a proper one or, more 
and in the terms of Seetion 7-1-26(4), was this 
finding and conclusion "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse 
of discretion or otherwise not in accordance with law." 
\Vhile we believe, for reasons already stated, that the 
<1efonse was properly stricken and that this finding and 
conclusion cannot be properly inquired into, if this court 
it- inclined to engage in such inquiry, it has before it the 
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entire record before the Cormnissioner with which to 
make a final determination. In the interests of the best 
use of judicial time and effort and for a faster disposi-
tion of this case, we suggest that it would be inappropri-
ate for this court to reverse the District Court simply 
on the basis of an erroneous granting of the motion to 
strike, but rather the court here should inquire into the 
sufficiency of the defense on its merits. \Ye are con-
fident that if the court ·wishes to make such an inquiry 
that the record amply supports the Commissioner's con-
clusion that the public convenience and advantage would 
he suhserved and promoted by the establishment of tlw 
\Valker Bank branch in South Ogden. Certainly there is 
nothing in the record that would indicate that in making 
snch conclusion the Commissioner's action "-as 
or capricious. Particularly is this true when the Com-
missioner was careful enough to inquire of the Attorney 
General on two occasions concerning this precise case 
and when he was unwilling, notwithstanding the Attorney 
General's prompting in his first opinion, to conclude that 
the public convenience and advantage would not be sub-
served. 
POINT III 
THAT PART OF THE LOWER COURT'S ORDER 
REQUIRING THE COMMISSIONER TO APPROVE 
WALKER BANK'S APPLICATION FOR THE SOUTH 
OGDEN BRANCH WAS LAWFUL AND NOT ERROR. 
The appeal from the Commissioner's decision was 
made because he committed an error of law in d(•nying 
W alkf'r Bank's application for the South Ogden branch. 
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Appellants in their brief at page 37 concede that the 
Commissioner denied the application as a matter of law 
hrcause that is what the Attorney General told him to do. 
This appears to be a concession that but for such instruc-
tion from the Attorney General the Commissioner would 
have granted the application. Of course this is apparent 
from the fact that the Commissioner found all of the 
neePssary three statutory conditions had been fully satis-
fied by Respondent. It would be a useless gesture for 
this court or any court to remand the case for the taking 
of further evidence or to assume that any question of 
fact remains. 
Appellants argue, however, that the review statute 
does not grant authority to the court to order the appli-
eation granted. No precedent or authority is cited for 
this proposition. It would appear to us that the terms 
of the statute empowering the reviewing court "to hold 
nnlawful and set aside any act, decision or ruling of the 
. . . commissioner . . ." is ample authority to grant an 
application which was denied illegally. This is particu-
larly true when the Commissioner has made an error 
as a matter of law. Arguably a reviewing court might be 
reluctant to substitute its judgment for that of the Com-
missioner where the question involved factual issues re-
lating to the public convenience and advantage element 
of the branch banking laws. But where the Commissioner 
has made an error of law, the courts are authorized and 
required to correct such error and to grant the relief 
prayed as if such error had not occurred. If having found 
:m Prror of law or an arbitrary or capricious act by the 
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Commissioner, the reviewing court must n•mand so that 
tlw Commissioner could exerci::-;e tlw ''discretionary 
powers" claimed by Appellant8, such discretion mi()'ht 
b 
well be exercised to ignore tlw ruling of the reviewinir 
t'l 
court. Such negation of judicial review cannot he toler-
ated. 
Appellants fnrther argue that because of tlw lapst· 
of time, the Commissioner should have a further oppor-
tunity to examine into the merits of the application. Tl1is 
is an argument verging on the ridiculous for its snggPsts 
that once the laborious process of a pplica ti on, ]waring, 
review in the District Court and review by this court has 
been concluded, there must be a further hearing or at 
least fnrther proceedings beyond that. \V alker Bank 
filPd its application for this branch on :March 21, 19GS. 
rrhe hearings on the application commenced April 
19GS and after two days of hearings, the matkr was con-
tined to May 13, 1968, the continuance being granted at 
the request of the protesting banks, not the request of 
\Yalker Bank. The two Attorney General's Opinions 
were requested by the Commissioner at the bP11est of till· 
protesting banks and were not reqnested by \Valker Bank. 
vVhen the Commissioner finally entered his Order on 
September 9, 1968, an appeal wa8 filed within two weeb 
aftPr and was pushed fonvard as rapidly as possible as 
the record "·ill disclose. To say now that this less than 
normal delay of litigation makes the factual basis of the 
decision unrealistic is a conclusion that is basically un-
supported by the facts and certainly not justified for the 
particular case. After expediting the matter as we have, 
Appellants are in no position to claim that we must reliti-
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ga tC' the catw if Appellants are uuable to convince this 
<'ourt that the Commissioner did not err as a matter of 
law. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons it is submitted that the 
dPt1•rmination of the District Court was proper and 
"honld he affirmed in all respects and Respondent should 
lw awarded its costs. 
HPspectfully snhrnittPd, 
H. R. ·w al do, .Jr., 
of .JONES, \VALDO, HOL-
BROOK & McDONOUGH 
Attorneys for Plaintiff and 
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QUESTION 
l\1ay a branch bank be lawfully prohibited within 
tlH• corporate limits of South Ogden, Utah, a city of tlH· 
second class in which no unit bank is located, but which 
is immediately adjacent to Ogden City, another city of 
the second class in which are presently located five unit 
hanks, where it is shown by the evidence that the primary 
objective of the branch bank is not to serve South Ogden, 





The primary legislative restriction on the establish-
ment of branch banks in the State of Utah states: 
Except in cities of the first class, or within 
unincorporated areas of a county in which a city 
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of tlH' first class is located, no branch bank shall 
he <'stablisht>d in any city or town in which is lo-
<'ated a bank or hanks, state or national, regularly 
transacting a customary banking business, unless 
the bauk seeking to establish such branch shall 
take O\'Cr an existing bank. No unit bank organized 
and OJlPrating at a point where there are other 
01it•rating banks, statti or national, shall be per-
rnittt>d to be acquired by another bank for the 
pnrpmw of <c•stablishing a branch until such bank 
shall have bePn in operation as such for a period 
of fi\·e years.' 
The Utah 8tate Legislature has further specified 
tl1at: 
From and after the eff edive date of this act 
no unit hank and no branch bank shall be estab-
lished or anthorizPd to conduct a banking business 
<>xcPpt as lwr<>inbPiore in section 7-3-6 expressly 
J<'rom the forpgoing, it is apparent that the legis-
lntin· dPlineation of those areas in which branch banks 
and may not be established precludes the establish-
1nPnt of a branch bank in the City of Ogden, a city of the 
se<'ond class, with certain <.>xceptions not applicable here.3 
\Yhile it is clear that a branch bank may not be 
l'stablished in Ogden City with the factual basis pre-
srnted, the question arises as to whether a branch bank 
111a)- lw formed, in the immediately adjacent City of South 
Ogden. 
iUtah Code Ann. § 7-3-6 (Supp. 1967). 
2Utah Code Ann. § 7-3-6.3 (Supp. 1967). 
JBanks may establish branches by a "take process, 
the provision is specifically made inapplicable to cities of the first 
class. 
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Initially, it appears clear that Utah Code Ann. 
7-3-6 (Supp. 1967) does not directly prohibit additional 
branch banks in South Ogden, for the banking structnr .. 
of that city does not include any so-called ''unit" banh. 
However, the opposite assumption that a branch hank 
must be established does not necessarily follow. 
In addition to the legislative restrictions which havP 
been discussed, those seeking authority for the develo11-
rnent of branch banking must satisfy other overriding 
pr1:•requisites. The Utah StatP Legislature ha:,; providPrl 
that: 
No bank shall bP pnrnitkd to establish am 
branch or office until it :,;hall first ha\·<· bePn 
shown to tlw satisfaction ol' tlw hank co111111i:-: 
siorn·r that tlu· public convPniencP and advantaw· 
will be subsNved and promoted by the cstahlish-
lllPnt of such branch or office.4 
Thus, after it is det<:•rrnined that the specifie statu-
tOl'.\. prohibition does not foreclosP thP anticipated hranclt 
hank, it is still incumbent upon tlw applicants to shcm 
that the public conveniPnce and advantag<' will he suh-
served h.'· the new facility. 
It appears from the facts presented that the pro-
posed facility is to be located within a ft'w fret of tlw 
southern boundary of Ogden City. It fnrtlwr appPar:-; 
that an objective of the applicant is to draw, not frorn 
the banking market of South Ogden, but from the marht 
of the Ogden metropolitan area generall_\-. It is po:,;sihlt> 
to conclude that the applicant is ath•rnpting to t-ffrct 
indirectly that which is otherwise specifically prohihikd 
4Utah Code Ann. § 7-3-6 (Supp. 1967). 
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liy the Utah Legislature and which may not, there-
for<', be done directly. 
It is the opinion of this office that the Bank Com-
lllissioner may refuse to permit a branch bank in South 
( >g<l<'n. The fact that the anticipated banking venture 
does not fall within the specific statutory prohibition 
dews not impose upon the commissioner an obligation to 
approv<, the venture. The commissioner must further 
he satisfied that the public convenience will be promoted. 
ln Utah, a restrictive policy with respect to branch 
banking has been enunciatted. 5 In the instant situation, 
it wonld not be unreasonable for the Bank Commissioner 
to <'onclude that the subject bank is attempting to invade 
ill directly an area from which it is specifically excluded 
statute. If such a determination were made, it would 
he Pntirt'ly appropriate for the commissioner to thwart 
tlw attt·rnpted subversion of the legislative policy against 
hrand1 banking in second class cities where unit banks 
<'Xist. 6 He need not subscribe to the geographical so-
phistr>· practiced by the applicant, and he may deny 
the application on the simple ground that the public 
ronvPnience and advantage will be subverted rather than 
snhsPrved. 
Dated this 26th day of July, 1968. 
PLH/rjs/t'j 
Res1wrtfull >, subrnitted, 
Phil L. Hansen, 
A ttornf'!' General 
Bank & Trust Company v. Taylor. 15 Utah 2d 234, 390 
P.2d 592 (1964). 
6Cf. American Bank & Trust Co. v. Saxon, 373 F.2d 283 (4th Cir. 
1967). 
